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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
It is unlikely that the newly elected government of Dilma 
Rousseff will make any fundamental changes to the major 
imperatives that underlie Brazilian policy: that is, 
macroeconomic stability and poverty alleviation. These 
policy imperatives have set the country on the road to good 
governance and have provided former presidents a chance to 
claim continuity.  While President Rousseff of the Workers’ 
Party (PT) may have a distinct style, personality, and set of 
leadership skills compared to her predecessors, she is 
expected to maintain the core macroeconomic stability and 
social policies that are currently in place.  
 
Many who expected Rousseff to be former president Luiz 
Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s carbon copy are discovering that 
from day one she has showcased a different governing style 
than her mentor.  She has emphasized her commanding 
authority and has brought about fresh approaches to delicate 
matters, which entail domestic economic issues and foreign 
policy.  For example, her administration has aggressively 
applied a set of macro-prudential measures to counter 
inflationary pressures on the Brazilian currency (Real). And 
in foreign policy, she has steadfastly recalibrated Itamarity’s 
stance on the controversial issues, such as Iran, and now 
appears to have refocused its short-term efforts on cementing 
Brazil’s leadership role in the region’s southern cone.
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INSTITUTIONALIZED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
POLICIES1 
 
Critics have long deemed Brazil as the eternal country of the 
future.  It now seems that the future has finally arrived. 
Historically, Brazil’s boom and bust cycle, and its 
ramifications of poverty and inequality, have been 
inextricably linked to inflationary bubbles. Inflation is the 
known and feared ghost that Brazilians have dealt with many 
times in the past.  In 1994, however, then Finance Minister, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso established the bases for 
economic sustainability with the launching of the Plan Real. 
The Plan entailed dropping the hyper-inflated Cruzeiro and 
introducing the Real as the new currency. Officials took 
calculated steps in implementing the Real; they first 
temporarily introduced the URV, a transitional currency that 
served as a catalyst to clamp down potential inflationary 
pressures on the newly created Real.  
 
With that caveat, Brazil’s government has been highly 
constrained both institutionally and electorally to maintain 
macroeconomic stability and keep inflation under control. 
Keeping inflation in check not only shaped the next set of 
elections, but also provided a shock to the Brazilian political 
system. For example, because of the devastating impact of 
hyperinflation, the president’s policies to control inflation 
were viewed favorably by a great majority of the public, 
which had become strongly averse to inflation.  
 
Since the Brazilian electorate holds the president accountable 
mostly for economic growth, inflation control, and the 
                                                 
1 In this session the author freely borrowed pieces from his recent short 
commentaries posted by Brookings Institution (http://www. 
brookings.edu/experts/pereirac.aspx), where the author is a Visiting 
Fellow. See, Carlos Pereira’s The Impact of Brazil’s Presidential 
Elections: Different Roads, Similar Direction (September 28, 2010) and 
Brazilian President Rousseff’s First Governing Coalition: Better, But not 
Good Enough (February 8, 2011). 
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unemployment rate, the 1994 election divided the country 
between those that viewed inflation control as the top 
political priority versus those that, at the time, did not 
understand inflation control as key for electoral success and 
for the wealth of the country. So it is that keeping 
inflationary pressures in check reshaped the political 
calculations and provided stability and predictability on 
future electoral events. 
 
At the same time that macroeconomic stability then became 
a policy imperative in Brazilian politics, so too has social 
policy. For example, providing economic and social mobility 
opportunities to the poor through the implementation of 
large-scale programs, such as bolsa família, noncontributory 
pensions, and more access to credit is no longer a residual 
policy in Brazil. At present day, social policies are as 
important as macroeconomic stability and wield significant 
weight in the elections. In fact, during the 2010 presidential 
election, the campaign platform of the main opposition 
candidate, José Serra, promised to double the number of 
families assisted by bolsa família.2 
 
Brazil has achieved significant social progress. According to 
ActionAid, Brazil has been considered, for its second 
consecutive year, as a leading country that “really fights 
hunger” among developing countries as a whole. According 
to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) Monitor, Brazil has already achieved four of the 
                                                 
2 Bolsa Familia is the largest conditional cash transfer program in the 
world. Launched in 2003, it provides income support to poor families, 
subject to their fulfilling of certain human development requirements, 
such as child school attendance including participation in supplementary 
socio-educational activities, vaccinations, nutritional monitoring, prenatal 
and post natal tests. Since its creation, coverage has expanded rapidly. 
The number of beneficiaries tripled in four years rising from 3.6 million 
in 2003 to 11.1 million in 2006 reaching around 75 per cent of the 
estimated number of poor families. Read more: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/jobcrisis/download/109B09_28_engl.pd
f.  
4 
 
eight MDGs. These are:  to eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote 
gender equality and empower women, and combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.   The other four 
goals – reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, 
ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a 
global partnership for development – are considered very 
likely to be achieved. Although the actual achievement of 
some of these goals is questionable, it is important to keep in 
mind that these are no trivial accomplishments in a society 
where macroeconomic mismanagement and inequality were 
for decades the most salient features. 
 
Bolsa família proved very successful not only in combating 
inequality but also in winning votes in President Lula’s 
reelection in 2006, and in increasing votes for his successor 
Dilma Rousseff four years later. The electoral base who 
voted Lula into office in 2006, however, was not the same as 
the one that voted for him in 2002.   The PT’s traditional 
electoral base was mostly formed by better educated and 
high income voters in the relatively urban and industrial 
sectors in Brazil’s south and southeast. However, Lula’s 
social programs – especially the conditional cash transfer 
scheme that targeted low-income families – were critical in 
explaining his good electoral performance among low-
income voters. Hunter and Power (2007) show the impact of 
targeted social policy on voter choice by correlating election 
results with the implementation of the bolsa família program 
at the sub-national level. They demonstrate that between 60 
and 85 percent of votes from the impoverished north and 
northeast of the country went to Lula. Bolsa família became 
the centerpiece of social policy, and the number of Brazilian 
families covered climbed rapidly to more than 12.7 million 
families or about 50.8 million people – more than two thirds 
of whom earned less than $33.00 a month. Moreover, the 
program was implemented at the relatively low cost of 2.5 
percent of all government expenditure (Hunter and Sugiyama 
2009). 
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Between 2001 and 2007, Brazil experienced a sharp and 
continuous decline in income inequality at an average rate of 
1.2 percent per year. The per capita income of the poorest 
groups grew fast and substantially in this period despite 
modest economic growth of overall per capita income. This 
decline in inequality and poverty, however, should not only 
be interpreted as a result of poverty alleviation policies via 
public transfers. Barros, et al. (2010) argues that changes in 
labor income have played an equally important role. In 
addition, they stress that the decline of inequality has to do 
with the accelerated expansion of access to education during 
the 1990s. 
 
A FORWARD MARCH  
Poverty alleviation policies along with macroeconomic 
stability policies have led to the emergence of a “new middle 
class” in Brazil. According to Neri (2010), the Brazilian 
middle class – families earning between R$1,064 and 
R$4,561 per month – represented 42 percent of the 
population in 2003. Today that share is 52 percent and is 
expected to reach 55 percent in 2014. The Gini coefficient 
that measures Brazil’s income inequality suggests that 
millions have moved out of poverty and entered the middle 
class every year since 2005.  
 
This finding suggests that there will be more and more 
domestic consumers in the Brazilian market, which in turn 
will increase the potential to attract even more international 
investors to a market that is already one of the most 
attractive in the world – so much so that the Brazilian 
government has taken steps to curtail foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Brazil to keep the economy from 
overheating. This policy implementation process showcases 
a welcomed maturity from the Brazilian government in its 
attempt to rein in the FDI avalanche, but at the same time, it 
paradoxically gives international investors one more reason 
to invest in Brazil. 
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paradoxically gives international investors one more reason 
to invest in Brazil. 
 
Overall, Brazil has evolved in a manner that has not only 
convinced top credit rating agencies to raise Brazilian debt to 
“investment grade,” but also led Brazil to reach the status of 
countries with high human development index. The 
combination of macroeconomic stability policies and a 
favorable international economic outlook created the 
conditions for economic growth that allowed social 
protection policies to be generated.  
 
As a result, the Lula administration enjoyed massive popular 
support and left the government with an astounding 87 
percent approval rate. Therefore, Dilma Rousseff’s 
government will not have the political and/or electoral 
incentives to make comprehensive changes to Brazil’s two 
main policy imperatives.  
 
The incentive-structure of Brazil’s political institutions is too 
ingrained and will continue to push Brazil in a similar 
direction. While Rousseff might decide to increase the 
government’s ability to cool off the economy by enhancing 
the role of governmental agencies who subsidize the 
domestic private sector with cheap loans – and as a result, 
perhaps prevent Brazil from developing as quickly – she will 
not be able to take the country backwards. 
 
A FRAGMENTED AND SOMETIMES POLARIZED 
ENVIRONMENT  
 
Brazil possesses a complex mix of electoral institutions that 
allow for the representation of diverse interests within its 
multiparty system. Often this is viewed as encouraging levels 
of fragmentation and decentralization that can complicate the 
policy-making process (Ames 2001). Yet, Brazil also 
possesses some “majoritarian” institutions (provisional 
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decree, urgency petition, budgetary power) that centralize 
power and encourage national-level governability. These two 
sets of institutions represent poles of a continuum; they are 
hybrids combining consensual and majoritarian elements at 
the same time. 
 
The current institutional and political balance is relatively 
recent in Brazil. The Brazilian political system is a good 
example of a historical struggle between those advocating 
for consensual institutions (for example, characterized by 
proportional representation, federalism, multiparty system, 
and an independent judiciary) which prevailed during 
democratic periods (especially from 1946 to 1964), and those 
that promote strong centralism as seen during periods of 
authoritarian rule (Getulio Vargas’ New State from 1937-
1945, and the military dictatorship of 1964-1988). It took 
two decades for the 1988 Constitution to institute an 
environment capable of combining those apparently 
antagonistic institutional features and for democracy to 
become consolidated – which today, it is the only game in 
town.3 
 
Brazilian democracy has maintained several consensual 
features such as presidentialism, proportional representation 
(PR) with open list in the electoral system, a fragmented 
party system, federalism, and an independent judiciary. In 
the opposite direction, however, the legislature has delegated 
the bulk of its powers to the executive, such as the power to 
rule by decree, line item and total veto, emergency measures, 
exclusive rights to legislate on budgetary and administrative 
issues, and the power of unilaterally executing the budget 
(Pereira and Mueller 2004). This paradoxical institutional 
combination generated by the new Constitution made 
                                                 
3 According to Przeworski (1991), democracy is consolidated when 
under given political and economic conditions a particular system of 
institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine 
acting outside democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to 
try again within the same institutions under which they have lost. 
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democracy self-enforcing; that is, all the relevant political 
forces have found it best to continue to submit their interests 
and values to the uncertain interplay of the democratic 
institutions.4 
 
The underlying rationale for the new constitution was to 
prevent institutional instability and deadlock/stalemate 
between Congress and the Executive, which was extremely 
prevalent in the previous period of democratic rule (from 
1946 to 1964). In addition, the majority of legislators learned 
from that period and from 22 years of dictatorship that an 
institutionally weak president could not last without some 
sort of governing capacity to enforce his/her agenda. 
Legislators decided not to change the electoral rules – that is, 
not to reform the PR open-list system in the new constitution 
because it would create too much uncertainty with respect to 
legislators’ electoral survival – but they also opted to transfer 
institutional resources to the Executive to ensure 
governability and stability of the democratic game.  
 
The most important consequence of this new institutional 
design was that democracy has no longer been under threat 
in Brazil. With the exception of President Fernando Collor 
de Mello (1990-1992), all elected presidents since 1988 have 
been able to build reasonably stable post-electoral majority 
coalitions within Congress and have experienced relatively 
strong party discipline within the presidential governing 
coalition, along with a high level of governability. Although 
                                                 
4 According to Melo (2009), the collective wisdom on Latin America was 
that in countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers 
and where multi-party coalitions prevailed, such countries would be 
doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries having 
weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate 
democratic rule. After almost two decades this prediction failed. The key 
to solving the paradox of strong presidents and robust democracies is that 
democratic stability in Latin American countries has been engendered by 
the existence of an extended system of checks and balances and rule of 
law, which are ultimately generated by political competition and power 
fragmentation. 
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none of the elected presidents belonged to a party with a pre-
electoral absolute majority of the seats, they have, 
nevertheless, been able to achieve congressional support by 
use of their extensive legislative and non-legislative powers 
as well as gains from exchange mechanisms under the 
discretion of the executive (Pereira and Mueller 2004). In 
fact, Brazil has not yet faced a truly divided government 
under the current set of political institutions. This is not 
coincidental given that institutional powers and resources are 
held and selectively distributed by the Executive. The 
combination of provisional decree, vetoes, urgency petitions, 
budget dominance, and strategic allocation of resources 
(pork and cabinets) provides the Executive with an 
impressive set of instruments for imposing its legislative 
priorities on Congress’ agenda.  
 
The new Constitution of 1988 should, therefore, be viewed 
as the critical junction that defined present political 
institutions in Brazil and the powers of political actors. It 
provided the institutional terrain for political cooperation to 
take place. It also set the notion of strong executive power(s) 
capable of driving the policymaking process. It is important 
to keep in mind, however, that the institutional setting that 
emerged from the 1988 Constitution was a consequence of 
the legislature’s choice and not a result of any sort of 
illegitimate usurpation of powers (as has been the case in 
other Latin American countries). To some extent the 1988 
Constitution could be understood as a function of a historical 
learning process from previous unsettled institutional 
experiences, especially from the preceding very 
representative and fragmented democratic period (1946-
1964) and the centralized military regime (1964-1985) that 
followed. Both extreme institutional conditions in Brazil’s 
past could also be characterized as illustrations of limited 
access orders, where powerful individuals and groups 
cooperated through access to particular State benefits and 
privileges (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). During these 
periods, some groups had more access to benefits than 
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others. This led to several often polarized and violent 
conflicts among powerful elite groups fighting for a greater 
chunk of rents-seeking benefits. With the new Constitution 
of 1988, however, multiparty fragmentation was preserved, 
but at the same time a powerful executive emerged with the 
capacity to coordinate political parties in coalition under the 
oversight of independent checks and balances institutions. 
 
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS UNDER 
ROUSSEFF’S COALITION GOVERNMENT  
 
As said before, presidential powers have generally allowed 
the President to initiate, pursue and approve much of his/her 
policy agenda. Whereas such a scenario may seem perilous 
given Latin America’s history with strong presidents, 
Brazilian political institutions provide safeguards against 
abuse of powers. Although the separation of powers is 
clearly biased towards the president, several other political 
actors with different motivations (separation of purpose) are 
able to check the president’s actions in different ways. Thus, 
if an incompetent or ill-intentioned president were to come to 
power, strong presidential powers would not mean a blank 
check to pursue misguided policy. Therefore, Brazilian 
presidents still need to build and sustain a majority coalition 
in Congress in order to govern. Without a safe and faithful 
majority coalition in Congress the presidents run the risk of 
facing massive problems either to deal with controversial roll 
calls in his/her agenda (a very good example was the recent 
roll call about increasing the minimal wage) or when it needs 
to block unwelcome opposition initiatives. 
 
Brazil’s 2010 election was unique in that, in numeric terms, 
the electoral coalition supporting Rousseff obtained the 
majority of seats in both chambers of Congress – while in the 
past, most coalition’s majority governing capacities have 
been achieved after the elections, as explained prior. 
Rousseff’s coalition will have nearly 64 percent of seats in 
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the Senate and 61 percent in the Chamber of Deputies (see 
Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1:  POLITICAL PARTY SEAT ALLOCATION 
IN THE BRAZILIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
 
Rousseff’s Electoral 
Coalition 
Opposition Independent 
Part
y 
Curre
ntly 
Elect
ed 
2010 
Part
y 
Curre
ntly 
Elect
ed 
2010 
Par
ty 
Curre
ntly 
Elect
ed 
2010 
PT 79 88 
PSD
B 
59 53 PP 40 41 
PMD
B 
90 79 
DE
M 
56 43 PV 14 15 
PR/P
L 
41 41 PTB 22 21 
PH
S 
03 02 
PSB 27 34 PPS 15 12 
PS
L 
 01 
PDT 23 28 
PM
N 
03 04 
PR
P 
 02 
PSC 16 17 
PSO
L 
03 03 
PR
TB 
 02 
PCd
oB 
12 15 
PTd
oB 
01 03    
PRB 01 08       
PTC 02 01       
TOT
AL 
297 
(57.9
%) 
311 
(60.6
2%) 
 
137 
(26.7
%) 
139 
(27.0
9%) 
 
57 
(11.1
%) 
63 
(12.2
8%) 
Source: Brazilian Electoral Tribunal – TSE. 
 
Based on these favorable numbers it has been widely 
speculated that Rousseff will face fewer difficulties with 
Congress than Lula did. In addition to the number of seats, 
however, other aspects discussed below are also fundamental 
for understanding executive-legislative relations in 
Rousseff’s multiparty presidential administration.  
 
President Rousseff will have to make at least three 
interconnected managerial choices that would have 
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important consequences for the quality, sustainability, costs, 
and capacity of governing in Congress. These choices 
include: the number of parties in the coalition, the 
ideological heterogeneity of those parties, and the degree of 
proportionality or power sharing among coalition partners.  
 
In a co-authored forthcoming paper from Power and Raile 
(2011), it is argued that each of these managerial choices 
engenders trade-offs and different costs for the executive. 
Coalitions that are larger, have greater ideological 
heterogeneity, or have a higher concentration of power in 
one of its members, are more difficult to manage. The less 
proportional the cabinet, the less satisfied the coalition 
partners in the legislature, and the higher the cost of 
sustaining their loyalty. A cabinet constituted 
disproportionately of an executive’s own partisans may also 
create external animosity, but the larger effect would be to 
disrupt relationships within the governing coalition. Such 
situations imply a higher cost of governing, more 
coordination problems, and a greater necessity of side 
payments (pork barrel, patronage, policy concessions, etc.) to 
discipline the coalition.  Ignoring such expectations can 
undermine support from within the governing coalition.  
 
A comparison of how the former three Brazilian presidents 
managed their respective coalitions in Congress might be 
illustrative for understanding the impact of those choices on 
executive-legislative relations in the future government of 
Dilma Rousseff (see Table 2 in the Appendix). 
 
President Collor had an initial governing coalition that 
consisted of only three political parties. Collor’s coalition 
began with 245 seats, which was about 49 percent; this was 
clearly a minority coalition government. His cabinet was 
relatively homogeneous, featuring mostly right-wing parties. 
His cabinets, however, were extremely disproportional. In 
his first cabinet, 60 percent of the posts went to nonpartisan 
ministers. He did not share power with parties that could 
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support him in times of need. In 1992, facing massive 
popular protests and without a credible and sustainable 
coalition in Congress, the cost of “buying” support 
eventually caught up with Collor.   He was impeached and 
removed from office. 
 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), on the other hand, 
learned quickly that governing without a sustainable 
coalition in Congress would be too risky. He initially 
decided to include only four parties in his governing 
coalition (Social Democratic Party-PSDB, Liberal Party-
PFL, Labor Party-PTB, and the Democratic Party-PMDB). 
Nevertheless, within two years he realized that he would 
need a broader majority to gain approval of his numerous 
constitutional reform proposals, which would require 
majority support in both houses.  Cardoso recruited two 
additional parties (the PPB and PPS) into his government, 
bringing the coalition size up to almost 75 percent of seats in 
Congress. Although large in size, the Cardoso coalition was 
not endangered by internal ideological differences. The 
coalition was center-right and shared the president’s views 
on constitutional reforms. The outstanding feature of the 
Cardoso coalition was the cabinet’s high level of 
“coalescence” (Amorim Neto 2002).  Cardoso’s coalition 
management was decisive in helping him to sustain his 
majority coalition for almost eight years at a comparatively 
low cost. 
 
Lula adopted a different coalition management approach. He 
formed an eight party coalition and increased the number of 
cabinet-level posts from 21 to 35 to accommodate the 
president’s own Workers’ Party-PT loyalties, which was 
awarded no fewer than 20 portfolios.  In December 2003, the 
PMDB was added to the coalition as the ninth party in the 
cabinet but received only two cabinet positions. The PT did 
not “make room” for the PMDB. This skewed allocation 
increased the PT’s dominance over its governing coalition 
partners. This sharp reduction in proportionality occurred 
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exactly at the same time the mensalão is alleged to have 
begun5. The PT controlled 60 percent of the cabinet 
portfolios while supplying only 29 percent of the coalition’s 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In his second term in 
office, Lula seems to have learned from the mensalão 
scandal by adjusting his governing coalition and allocating 
more cabinets to other coalition members; but the PT 
continued to monopolize his cabinet. The ideological 
spectrum of Lula’s coalition was much more diverse than 
that of Cardoso’s, spanning from extreme left wing to 
extreme right wing parties.  
 
How about the coalition profile of Dilma Rousseff’s 
government? Like Lula, Rousseff built a very heterogeneous, 
over-sized, and over-concentrated governing coalition, 
preferring to satisfy the internal factions within the PT.  As 
expected, Rousseff decided to invite a large number of 
partners into her coalition cabinet, but the number was 
slightly smaller than that of Lula’s. Whereas Lula had eight 
political parties in his first cabinet, Rousseff invited seven. 
The number of parties did in fact translate into a larger 
majority within Congress since the nominal size of 
Rousseff’s coalition enjoys 328 seats in Brazil’s Chamber of 
Deputies, which is above the 60 percent supermajority of 
308 votes needed for constitutional amendments. Therefore, 
if she faces problems pursuing her political agenda, it would 
not be credible for her to blame the political opposition. 
Recently Rousseff proved her control over her coalition and 
rammed through in a total partisan manner the approval of 
the minimum wage law with the initial proposed amount of 
545 Reais. She pulled this show of force even though she 
                                                 
5 The "mensalao" relates to payments alleged to have been made each 
month in 2003 and 2004 to opposition politicians by President Lula's 
Workers Party (PT), which had a minority in Congress and governed 
through a coalition of several parties. The payments, said to be around 
$13,000 (£6,500) a month to lawmakers, were allegedly used to buy their 
support so they would vote in line with the PT. Read more: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4676435.stm. 
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faced mounting pressure from the unions who historically 
have backed the PT; nevertheless Rousseff along with Lula’s 
vocal support reigned in her coalition and commanded 
through the legislature her initial proposal without any 
negotiations.   
 
The ideological spectrum of Rousseff’s coalition is very 
similar to that of Lula’s, spanning from extreme leftwing to 
extreme rightwing parties. Although Rousseff will certainly 
try to maintain the core macroeconomic stability and social 
policies currently in place, we should not view coalition 
problems as a function of the ideological diversity of her 
governing coalition. That is, as the policy agenda will be 
very similar to her predecessor’s agenda, Rousseff will 
probably not face too much opposition from coalition 
members as a function of their different ideological 
preferences. 
 
Concerning power sharing, Rousseff’s first cabinet is less 
monopolistic than Lula’s given that she allocated 17 (around 
46 percent) cabinet positions to PT while Lula allocated 21 
posts (60 percent). The coalition formatter again received a 
substantial cabinet bonus. The Brazilian Democratic Party 
(PMDB) has also been over-allocated with positions with 6 
portfolios (37 percent). This clearly illustrates Rousseff’s 
intent to please the second largest party in Brazil’s Chamber 
of Deputies, the largest party in the Senate, as well as the 
party of Rousseff’s vice-president. 
 
Table 3 compares cabinet disparity or the difference between 
the intra-coalitional percentages of cabinet posts held by the 
party and the intra-coalitional percentage of lower legislative 
house seats held by the party. The only parties with positive 
cabinet disparities within Rousseff’s coalition are PT and 
PMDB, with 18.95 and 12.93, respectively. Hence, these two 
parties received a disproportionately high percentage of 
cabinet posts, which do not reflect their proportional weight 
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in Congress, 88 seats (26.99 percent) and 79 seats (24.23 
percent), respectively. 
 
TABLE 3: CABINET DISPARITY AMONG BRAZILIAN 
GOVERNMENT  
(COLLOR, CARDOSO, LULA, AND ROUSSEFF) 
 
Party Collor Cardoso Lula Dilma 
PSDB  2.59   
PFL -17.14 -8.51   
PMDB -43.06 -12.26 -18.82 12.93 
PP  -6.23  -9.87 
PPS  3.97 -3.43  
PTB  -3.38 -13.18  
PT   31.38 18.95 
PDT    -5.88 
PCdoB   2.88 -1.9 
PL/PR   -10.66 -9.87 
PSB   -3.43 -5.02 
PV   0.97  
PRN 0.2    
 
Note: “Cabinet Disparity” is the difference between the intra-coalitional 
percentage of cabinet posts held by the party and the intra-coalitional 
percentage of lower legislative house seats held by the party. Negative 
values indicate that a party has received a disproportionately low 
percentage of cabinet posts, while positive values indicate a 
disproportionately high percentage of cabinet posts.  Chart appears in 
Carlos Pereira’s Brazil’s President Rousseff’s First Governing 
Coalition…op. cit. 
 
However, other important parties participating in Rousseff’s 
coalition received cabinet seats that were worse than their 
share of lower-chamber legislative seats. These parties were 
severely under-rewarded, particularly the Popular Party-PP, 
Liberal Party-PL/PR, Democratic Labor Party-PDT and 
Brazilian Socialist Party-PSB, which received a 
disproportionately low percentage of cabinet posts (-9.87, -
9.87, -5.88, and -5.02, respectively). As these parties had 
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their initial expectations dashed by receiving a 
disproportionately low number of cabinet seats, we should 
observe that they will receive other forms of compensation, 
such as a higher distribution of monetary benefits in the form 
of pork barrel politics and/or patronage in lower ranks of the 
public administration, in order to keep them in line with the 
government. Otherwise, growing dissatisfaction would lead 
to more frequent coalition defections and consequently 
higher difficulties of sustaining and coordinating political 
support in Brazil’s Congress. In other words, in addition to 
numerically aggrandizing coalitions, the way presidents 
manage their coalitions also matters for presidential success 
in Congress. 
 
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. RELATIONS 
 
The first official international trip of President Dilma 
Rousseff was to Argentina on January 31, 2011. This visit 
was a clear sign of her intention to follow Lula’s main 
foreign policy goals of prioritizing regional integration 
within Latin America – to consolidate Brazil’s status as a 
regional power – and furthering leadership among 
developing countries within the “global south.” 
 
Brazil has played an important role in establishing new 
multilateral organizations like Mercosur, although in this 
particular case it has had much more success in developing 
political cohesion than true economic integration. Under the 
Lula administration, Brazil stepped up to play a more active 
role in maintaining regional peace and stability; however, its 
growing commercial and political influence has received 
some pushback from neighboring countries who fear a 
hegemonic power is in the makings.  
 
Historically, Brazil has looked inwards and was somewhat 
disconnected from its neighbors. In recent years, however, 
Brazilian diplomacy has broken with the Baron of Rio 
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Branco – considered the father of Brazilian diplomacy – 
inward-looking strategic diplomacy and has actively pursued 
a strategic plan to assert Brazilian interests in the region. In 
doing so, Brazil is going through a learning curve when 
dealing in conflictive situations as the major power. 
Bolivia’s President Evo Morales’ nationalization of the 
Brazilian state-owned oil company Petrobras’ natural gas 
activities was the first test of the new boundaries Brazilian 
diplomacy will have to deal with. 
 
The creation of regional multilateral organizations like 
UNASUR and the already established Mercosur have aided 
Brazil in dealing with such situations and allowed President 
Lula to exert presidentialism-based diplomacy with its 
counterparts. Rousseff will most likely also take advantage 
of the extra perks these gateways offer; however it remains 
to be seen how her personality will interact with other 
regional players.  
 
 Lula recognized this advantage in addition to the 
commercial opportunities multilateral organizations offered. 
He called for an enlarged Mercosur to better defend the 
region’s interests. This request falls in line with the idea that 
the bloc, from its inception, was designed to become the 
main axis of integration in South and even Latin America. 
There are, however, several caveats to this strategy that 
suggest that Lula’s call is somewhat of an elusive political 
statement. First, despite the fact that full membership is 
permitted to any Latin American country that requests 
admission, no country has ever requested it, aside from 
Venezuela, who has been waiting for over two years for its 
full admission, and at the present time, this outcome seems 
very unlikely.  
 
One of the reasons Mercosur has unconvincing credentials as 
an open regionalism mechanism is its admission process and 
what full admission entails. In order to gain full membership, 
countries would have to forgo their own trade policies and 
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agreements to abide by the bloc’s more protectionist rules (or 
Mercosur would have to lower its own trade tariffs). 
Countries that have signed Free Trade Agreements with the 
U.S., European Union (E.U.) or China, for example, would 
not be eligible for full membership under current Mercosur 
trade rules.  This would apply to Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
Mexico, and the Central American countries.  
 
Second, even if new members were to join, rather than 
increase the bloc’s bargaining power they would most likely 
enhance internal contradictions that stand in the way of 
negotiations. Since Mercosur’s decision-making process is 
by consensus, the inclusion of new members would increase 
the number of veto players. To avoid this risk, the bloc 
would have to adopt an E.U.-style of decision-making (i.e., 
majority voting), and/or directly deal with the economic 
asymmetries and trade disputes that exist today between 
member countries. As Mercosur seeks horizontal expansion, 
it will be pushed to address shortcomings of its vertical 
institutionalization. 
 
Although some important disagreements have emerged lately 
between the U.S. and Brazil (especially with regard to 
different policy approaches toward situations in Honduras, 
Iran, and trade issues) relations between the two countries 
have generally been constructive and positive in a wide 
range of issues, including: counter-narcotics, trade, human 
rights, energy, environment, promoting bio-fuels, intellectual 
property rights, and providing security in Haiti.  
Nevertheless, Brazil has been one of the key opponents to a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas, and it has ongoing disputes 
over U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol, and the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations over U.S subsidies for cotton farmers. 
Brazil had also developed concerns about the initial 
agreement between the U.S. and Colombia to provide the 
U.S. access to seven Colombian military bases. Yet Brazil 
too under Lula signed defense agreements with the U.S. 
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Most recently, Brazil and the U.S. have also clashed over 
policy toward Iran. Whereas Brazilians perceived the Iranian 
Nuclear Exchange Agreement brokered by then foreign 
minister Celso Amorim in partnership with Turkey as a kind 
of confidence building step to bring Iran back to 
negotiations, the U.S. understood the agreement as a 
delaying tactic and decided to go ahead approving extra 
sanctions in the U.N. Security Council. However, having 
differences is natural between countries with diverse 
interests, in which foreign policy on both sides is inevitably 
affected by conflicting domestic political determinants and 
economic disputes. It is important to point out that despite 
current and historical differences, Brazilian and U.S. 
interests are not identical, but they are potentially 
compatible. 
 
It is still too soon to predict how Brazil and U.S. relations 
will evolve under Dilma Rousseff’s administration. 
However, the Rousseff government has made considerable 
changes that may yield improved relations. Under her 
tutelage, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) has 
changed reigns.  The new Minister of Foreign Relations is 
none other than the former Brazilian Ambassador to the 
U.S., Antonio Patriota, who has significantly softened 
Brazil’s rhetoric on the Iranian issue. As a consequence, 
Brazil no longer demands to participate in the negotiations. 
 
In addition, Itamaraty has ordered its embassies and UN 
mission to prepare a review assessing the state of Brazilian 
foreign policy. The report will address human 
rights in countries with authoritarian regimes and also focus 
on Brazil's relationship with the United States. Rousseff 
herself has repeatedly asserted her administration’s 
commitment to human rights anywhere in the world, a move 
that is seen as a clear distancing effort from Iran. 
 
This could be seen as a sign that new avenues of cooperation 
and fewer tensions may evolve with the U.S. President 
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Obama recently announced in January 2010 that he will visit 
Brazil. This could be an opportunity to reopen the 
discussions at the highest level, which could focus on several 
of the controversial issues mentioned above.  
 
It’s clear that Brazil sees a national interest in the creation of 
a world order more hospitable to a pluralism of interests, and 
the Rousseff government will follow this caveat. However 
the manner in which it will do so seems to entail a gentler 
diplomatic approach to that of the Lula administration. For 
the U.S.’s part, it sees managing its relationship with the new 
Brazilian administration as an increasing priority for US 
foreign policy. This convergence of interests will also have 
to deal with essential challenges for US-Brazil relations, 
which at this stage would be to first build greater synergy on 
major global issues, which are diverse and reflect complex 
interests from both countries. 
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